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CARR has been awarded funding under the Economic and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) co-investment pilot scheme for a project on “risk culture in financial 
organizations”. ESRC support is conditional on matched co-
funding with other parties, and we have been successful in 
securing the further support needed from the Chartered Institute 
of Management Accountants (CIMA), the Chartered Insurance 
Institute (CII), and the Lighthill Risk Network. My thanks go to 
all these bodies and also to the Knowledge Transfer Network 
for Financial Services, which has acted as a broker for this 
research partnership. Future editions of Risk & Regulation will 
report on the results of our work.
There has been much talk of “risk culture” as one of the 
root causes of the financial crisis which began in 2008. It is 
widely accepted that there were cultural barriers to robust risk 
assessment in banks and a systematic failure to challenge high 
risk practices. Yet little in this diagnosis is genuinely new. For 
many years we have known that things rarely fail because of 
lack of information or knowledge (the exception being the lack 
of knowledge about systemic interconnectedness in credit 
markets). Rather, accidents and disasters are usually preceded 
by many smaller, less noticeable events and warnings which 
organizations find hard to process and make actionable.
These early warnings and missed opportunities for action have 
interested organization scholars for several decades. Barry 
Turner’s work was pioneering in this respect. He coined the 
term “incubation period” to describe the timeframe over which 
disasters unfold; they are never truly sudden events, although 
actors are always surprised. In the context of “high reliability” 
organizations dealing with, for example, public transport and 
nuclear energy, scholars and practitioners have focused on 
the need to enhance “safety culture”. And Diane Vaughan’s 
classic study of the Challenger launch decision in 1986 added 
the powerful idea of “normalized deviance” to our analytical 
vocabulary. Applied to financial institutions prior to 2007, there 
is broad agreement that reckless and uncontrolled trading 
activity became normalized, not just for banks but also for their 
regulators. Those who, at the time, could see the underlying 
pathology of this normalized activity typically found themselves 
marginalized and deprived of authority.
This body of work provides the foundations for our future 
research into risk culture in financial organizations. However, the 
very category of “risk culture” poses methodological challenges. 
We don’t really know precisely what “risk culture” is or refers 
to, and we should not presume to know in advance the very 
thing that is puzzling. Of course, many practitioners have views 
on what risk culture is, and we shall be seeking these views 
and looking for common themes. But it may be that the very 
idea of risk culture is more a symptom of other things than a 
clear object of management. So we need to find out more, 
focus on identifiable elements of organizational culture and 
seek to understand the ways in which they are relevant to, and 
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organizations. 
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intertwined with, risk management. Yes, incentives are likely 
to be crucial; yes, CEO leadership and “tone at the top” will 
also be important. But we also expect to find new factors and 
relationships which will be pertinent.
Another challenge for the risk culture project is that it is explicitly 
intended as a form of knowledge exchange. We must jump the 
high bar of our own scientific standards – there is no negotiation 
on this. But we also have a requirement to feed back our findings 
in a concrete way which is potentially useful for, say, Chief Risk 
Officers and regulators as they think about risk culture. Culture 
is typically not something that can be switched on and off, so 
the development of any kind of management instrument in 
this space is fraught with difficulties. In addition, we know that 
there are already several risk culture “dashboards” out there 
in the market place.
My co-travellers on this project – Simon Ashby at the University 
of Plymouth and Tommaso Palermo at LSE – and I are very 
excited by these challenges, but we are also cautious. We 
are looking forward to working closely with the large number 
of CROs who have expressed interest and support for the 
project, but we will also need to maintain our distance as 
analysts, since this is the best way to leverage real value from 
our efforts. To come up with something which has both scholarly 
and use value is a difficult balancing act. Furthermore, history 
shows that organizational failure is desirable provided that 
the externalities are not too great. So while we look forward to 
carrying out this research, we know that there may be better 
ways of mitigating those externalities than trying to manage 
something called “risk culture”.
Mike Power 
CARR Director
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the european leaders establishing the euro, argues Jon 
Danielsson, were guilty of hubris risk, letting politics dominate 
the economic reality. their successors now trying to resolve the 
sovereign debt crisis are repeating that mistake.
T he european sovereign debt crisis is no different to most other crises. of course, the specifics are different – just enough to 
bedevil the authorities. to complicate matters, it 
is really two crises in one: a sovereign debt crisis 
and a policy response crisis. of the two, the latter 
is the one doing the damage.
the underlying direct causes are now quite familiar: 
political desire for strong ties between european 
countries acting as the driving force of the european 
common market and the monetary union. History 
tells us that the success of such unions hinges 
critically on several factors, most importantly on a 
common fiscal policy and a sense of single national 
identity. Both are lacking in europe. 
By ignoring the necessary conditions, the european 
leaders establishing the euro were guilty of what 
might be termed hubris risk. the dictionary defines 
hubris as excessive pride or self-confidence; the 
word itself comes from Greek tragedies. Hubris 
was a driving force in creating the euro. It is now 
the biggest threat to european integration.
 
Sovereign defaults and corporate defaults
sovereign defaults are different from corporate 
defaults. A company goes broke when its debts 
exceed its assets, leading to restructuring or liquidation 
within a well defined legal framework. Countries don’t 
go bankrupt nor are they usually liquidated – with the 
single exception discussed below.
A country defaults because the government wants 
it to default, presumably after a cost-benefit analysis 
has weighed the cost of debt service against the 
losses incurred due to default. this means that 
countries tend to default long before they stop being 
able to service debt.
this voluntary nature of sovereign debt defaults 
is one aspect ignored by the architects of the 
euro. If a country does not want to pay, creditors 
have to resort to extreme methods for enforcing 
sovereign debt.
Newfoundland
In the long history of sovereign debt crises, creditors 
have resorted to a variety of extreme measures. 
However, they have never used liquidation in the 
same way that a corporation is liquidated – except 
in the case of newfoundland. We follow this story 
as told by Hale (2003).
newfoundland is situated on the eastern extremity 
of Canada. It used to be a British Dominion, like 
Canada or Australia, and by 1933 its sovereign debt 
was about three times its GDP. the government 
asked the British government for help. the 
British government obliged by sending a Royal 
commission, which promptly declared: “no part 
of the British empire has ever yet defaulted on 
its loan obligations.” the commission proposal 
was that newfoundland temporarily give up its 
independence to a UK appointed administration, 
which the locals agreed to.
Following World War II, the UK government felt 
compelled to resolve the issue, finding it most 
expedient to merge newfoundland with Canada. 
Because of the threat of sovereign default, the 
British government abolished the second oldest 
parliament in the empire, imposed a dictatorship 
on a country of 280,000 people with almost a 
century of direct democracy, and at the end of 
the process liquidated the country.
Vulture funds and extreme legal steps
While such extreme methods are not feasible today, 
vulture funds often buy heavily discounted government 
claims in secondary markets and pursue the 
impoverished debtors through courts internationally.
one of the clearest examples of this is the new York 
based investment fund elliot Associates, which 
paid $11 million in 1996 for heavily discounted 
Peruvian debt and then threatened to action against 
the country unless they paid it $58 million. Peru 
was forced to pay because it had sent funds to 
euroclear, a european settlement system, to pay 
bond holders participating in the restructuring. the 
Court of Appeals in Brussels enjoined euroclear 
from making those payments because they violated 
the securities’ pari passu clauses. since that held 
up the restructuring process, Peru felt it had no 
choice but to pay up. In that case it was a Belgian 
court ruling on english law. If the case had been 
brought in the UK, the outcome might well have 
been different.
“All the best countries default nowadays…”
As one watches the european sovereign debt 
crisis unfold, a familiar theme emerges. When it 
comes to crises in other countries, governments 
find it quite easy to take a strong moralistic view, 
claiming that the crisis was caused by mistakes 
made in the crisis country and necessitates strong, 
often retributive reform so that the misbehaving 
country, or others, will not be tempted to make the 
same mistakes again. the attitude of the european 
creditor countries to their european debtors falls 
very much into this category.
When the shoe is on the other foot, attitudes 
are likely to be somewhat different. the British 
government might have found the moral high 
ground easy when it came to the newfoundland 
default, but in discussing that resolution, the 
opposition Labour leader at the time, Clement 
“When it comes to other countries, rules have to be followed, and 
bailouts are to be avoided lest they create moral hazard. If the problem 
is at home, rules are meant to be broken. The eurozone is a good 
example of this.”
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Attlee, suggested that default was preferable to 
giving up democracy, adding “All the best countries 
default nowadays” with reference to Britain’s 
own default on wartime loans from the Us. the 
same Attlee, then Prime Minister, eventually gave 
newfoundland to Canada.
the attitude expressed by Clement Attlee 
demonstrates the often Janus-faced views of 
governments. When it comes to other countries, 
rules have to be followed, and bailouts are to 
be avoided lest they create moral hazard. If the 
problem is at home, rules are meant to be broken. 
the eurozone is a good example of this.
In setting up the euro, member states created 
both strict conditions for membership and the 
requirement of sensible conduct: the Maastricht 
criteria. If these had been adhered to, we would 
not have experienced the sovereign debt crisis. 
Countries like Greece, Portugal, and Italy would not 
have qualified for membership, and other countries 
would have had no choice but to keep their deficits 
under control. Admitting Greece, Portugal, and Italy 
meant that the euro was born with a handicap. 
It was, however, the deliberate violation of the 
Maastricht criteria ten years ago, first by Germany, 
and then by France, that signalled the end. since 
these two most important countries felt they could 
break the rules at will, so did everybody else.
Hubris risk
When the euro was envisioned, the challenges 
inherent in monetary unions were well known, 
even to the euro’s designers. the strains of the 
only monetary union in the eU at the time, Belgium 
and Luxembourg, clearly illustrated this. they 
shared a common currency, managed by Belgium. 
When, in the mid 1980s, Belgium felt the need 
to devalue without consulting Luxembourg, the 
latter’s government was not amused and resorted 
to setting up a parallel central bank with the ability 
to issue its own currency within 24 hours, just in 
case Belgium misbehaved again. If Belgium and 
Luxembourg found it difficult to live with the same 
currency, what were the prospects for a common 
currency for the entire european Union?
Most monetary unions fail as member countries 
drift apart over time and need very different 
monetary policies. to prevent failure, a strong 
binding force needs to be in place. this typically 
involves a common sense of national identity and 
a powerful central government harmonizing rules 
and regulations, with powers to transfer funds 
between regions.  even then strains do emerge. 
one only has to look at spain to see the challenges 
in implementing a transfer union. 
In the absence of these conditions, a monetary 
union is set up for failure. the eU leaders tried to 
address this problem by the Maastricht criteria, 
but then wasted no time in ignoring them. 
this problem was compounded by the prevailing 
view that sovereign risk had somehow been 
eliminated – a view strongly encouraged by banking 
regulations stipulating that sovereign debt is risk 
free. this both acts as a tax on other creditors and 
also sends a powerful signal. 
By ignoring all these issues the eU leaders at the 
time were guilty of hubris risk, the view that their 
political desire and ability to implement a monetary 
union was sufficient and that other considerations 
could be brushed away. It was just hubris.
Conclusion
surprisingly, even after the eU’s authorities were 
guilty of hubris risk in setting up the euro, the crisis 
resolution process shows the same familiar signs 
of further hubris risk. the direct financial cost of a 
Greek default is quite trivial in the european context. 
total Greek debt is around €350 billion, but the 
eU’s GDP is 15 trillion, so a total bailout of Greece 
would only cost the eU around 2.3 per cent of its 
annual GDP. the cost of not solving the problem 
is one order of magnitude higher, estimated by 
Danielsson and de Vries (2011) to be 22 per cent 
of european GDP.
It is hard to see the objective of the european 
authorities. Perhaps they want to make sure that 
anybody receiving bailouts will have to suffer so 
much that nobody else will be tempted to get 
into the same situation. or perhaps they want to 
use this as a means to create a proper european 
central government − a transfer union. Regardless 
of the motivation, the costs not only to europe but 
also to the world are too high. By letting political 
considerations triumph over economic reality, the 
eU’s authorities are yet again guilty of hubris risk.
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S ince December 2010, a wave of popular protest has swept through the Middle east and north Africa, toppling longstanding 
authoritarian rulers in tunisia, egypt, and Libya 
and leaving the regimes in syria and Yemen on the 
brink of collapse. Its size and contagious overspill 
has distinguished the civil uprisings from earlier 
expressions of discontent and demonstrated the 
magnitude of the socio-economic and political 
challenges facing the region. the uprisings 
dramatically revealed the narrow social base of 
support underpinning outwardly strong rulers and 
fundamentally challenged prevailing assumptions 
about their durability.
As the “Arab spring” enters its second year, it raises 
a number of important – and unresolved – issues 
over the pace and direction of change. these 
Assembly in october as the first step in a gradualist 
shift to democratic rule, the “day after” in egypt 
and Libya has been messy, contested, and violent. 
In part, this reflects the fact that it is far easier to 
mobilize against a shared opponent than around 
a common platform. thus, the mass opposition 
that forced out Mubarak and Gaddafi (the latter 
with external military assistance) rapidly splintered 
into groups with competing visions for change. this 
is evident both in the fragmented electoral results 
in egypt and in the ongoing clashes between the 
dozens of city- and tribal-based militias in Libya. 
A second cause of uncertainty is the unresolved 
tension between the elites and the street. In egypt, 
in particular, the toppling of President Mubarak 
did not precipitate a sweeping replacement of the 
elite groups that sustained his regime for three 
INSECURITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN 
THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB WORLD
include: the messy and uncertain pathways of 
transition in countries that have experienced regime 
change; a perilous stalemate between supporters of 
the status quo and advocates of change elsewhere; 
and a fiscally and politically unsustainable policy 
response to quieten participatory pressures in the 
oil-rich Gulf monarchies. Underpinning them is 
the magnitude of the economic challenges facing 
incumbent and successor governments alike. 
they portend a volatile future for regimes and their 
peoples as well as for an international community 
unsure of how, and with whom, to engage.
  
Uncertain transitions 
the euphoria of regime change in tunisia, egypt, 
and Libya has given way to acknowledgment 
that challenging landscapes lie ahead. With the 
exception of tunisia’s election to a Constituent 
CARRReseARCH
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen analyses emerging patterns of 
insecurity and uncertainty as the Arab uprisings enter a second year. 
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high. they considerably complicate the transition 
towards post-oil economies that must eventually 
take place.
Difficult next steps 
the developments outlined above are not taking 
place in a vacuum. they are occurring against 
the backdrop of the deep-rooted socio-economic 
challenges that proved the catalyst for revolutionary 
change in the first place. While the waves of anger 
at regimes’ perceived inability to address the 
economic stagnation produced the feelings of 
helplessness and rage that so galvanized the 
protests, the difficulty moving forward is that 
political change is not in itself sufficient. It is the 
first step in a larger process of transformation, but 
so many issues still have to be addressed.
Beyond the removal of the person of the autocrat 
and his immediate family, can the broader regime 
of “crony capitalists” and networks of patronage 
be removed? Is the military a part of the “old 
regime” and can it be trusted to oversee the 
move towards democracy? Can a counter elite 
emerge to challenge the existing elite, as happened 
(democratically and without a revolution) in turkey 
after 2002? How will the successor regimes cope 
with the massive socio-economic challenges, such 
as unemployment and economic exclusion, and 
with the inevitable disillusionment when people’s 
material situation fails to improve overnight? 
And will the international community support all 
countries in transition, rather than cherry picking 
support where it is in their interests (such as Libya) 
and condoning state repression where it is not 
(such as Bahrain)?
Answers to these questions will only become 
clearer in the longer term. the embedding of a 
genuine political transition is a long-term project 
and is intergenerational. the popular uprisings 
that sparked the Arab spring are giving way to 
the next phase of struggle over the direction and 
depth of reform. However, the transformative effect 
of new media and methods of communication has 
enabled people across the Arab world to reclaim 
the public sphere and shape public discourse 
around demands for accountability, justice, and 
freedom. these are powerful forces that have 
decisively shattered the political status quo. there 
is, at least, no going back to what went before; 
the exact nature of the structures that replace it 
remains to be seen.
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decades. entrenched structures of military and 
economic power have so far proven impossible 
to dislodge, leading to repeated calls to renew the 
revolution, this time against the supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces. similarly, in Yemen the tribal 
and military elites that underpinned President Ali 
Abdullah saleh’s 33-year rule only crumbled after 
months of intensifying street demonstrations. the 
protest movement subsequently were shut out 
of the elite-driven deal that removed saleh from 
office and – as in egypt – merely reoriented the 
demonstrations towards a new target.
   
It is still far from clear, and also too early to tell, 
if the instances of regime change will transit 
towards democratization and the consolidation 
of democratic institutions and values. significant 
obstacles remain in states weakened by the 
legacies of authoritarian rule, lacking autonomous 
civil society organizations and freely independent 
political parties, and unsure of the relationship 
between the citizen and the state inherent in 
concepts of citizenship. Moreover, any attempt to 
untangle the role of national armies hitherto deeply 
enmeshed in authoritarian political, economic, and 
social structures will certainly be divisive and quite 
likely contested.
 
Perilous stalemates
there are multiple countries where persistent 
protests have neither ended nor escalated into 
fully blown civil uprisings. two cases in point – one 
violent and the other volatile – are Bahrain and 
Jordan. A rapidly escalating protest movement 
briefly threatened to topple Bahrain’s ruling Al-
Khalifa family in March 2011. this was averted 
by the arrival of military forces from saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab emirates and by a relentless 
crackdown on all forms of dissent. Yet widespread 
opposition has continued amid the emergence 
– on all sides – of new youth-led movements. 
these groups have undercut the hitherto dominant 
dialectic between the regime and traditional 
opposition groups. they have injected radicalizing 
new elements into the political equation as the 
moderate middle ground is being outflanked 
and the contours of conflict are solidifying into 
permanent fissures.
 
the result is the erosion of the tacit understanding 
of the legitimate boundaries that opposition 
groups could operate within. these have been 
contested throughout the region, as evidenced by 
the convergence of political opposition and popular 
mobilization that forced Kuwait’s Prime Minister 
out of office in november 2011. King Abdullah 
of Jordan dismissed two prime ministers in 2011 
in response to persistent weekly protests that 
occasionally escalated into violent clashes with 
security forces. His attempt to deflect public anger 
at endemic corruption and perceived abuses of 
privilege onto the technocratic elites nevertheless 
failed to quell calls for greater political freedoms 
and moves towards a constitutional monarchy.
In these “halfway houses” (which also include 
Morocco) a decisive tipping point has yet to occur 
whereby continuing demonstrations acquire a 
momentum and trajectory of their own. there 
is, however, a danger that stop-gap or partial 
measures leave unresolved the basic divergence 
of expectations between authoritarian regimes bent 
on limiting concessions and opposition movements 
advocating deep and meaningful shifts in the 
source and distribution of power. It remains to be 
seen whether (and how) these differing viewpoints 
can be reconciled into a consensual settlement for 
political reform.
Short-term responses
the economic dimension of the Arab spring is 
as important as the political; indeed, the two are 
inextricably intertwined. this is especially the case 
in the redistributive political economies of the Gulf 
states. In these oil-producing states, the legacy of 
policy decisions taken in 2011 will reverberate in 
the years and decades ahead. Decisions focused 
overwhelmingly on short-term measures to blunt or 
preempt the social and economic roots of potential 
political tensions. Policies included hand-outs of 
cash (Kuwait and the UAe), creating jobs in already 
saturated public sectors (saudi Arabia and oman), 
and raising public sector workers’ wages and 
benefits (Qatar, saudi Arabia, and oman).
the scale of the spending is enormous. saudi 
Arabia announced two emergency welfare 
packages collectively worth $130 billion. this figure 
exceeded every annual government budget until 
2007 and included a provision to employ 60,000 
additional saudis in the Ministry of Interior alone. 
It also contained stipulations for increasing the 
minimum wage of public sector employees (but 
not private sector workers), offering a one-time 
bonus of a month’s pay to all public officials, and 
constructing 500,000 new homes to combat a 
crippling shortage of social housing. In oman, 
sultan Qaboos announced 35,000 new public 
sector jobs as well as a pay increase, while 
leaving the private sector largely untouched. even 
Qatar, with little to no threat of domestic unrest, 
announced 60 per cent increases in basic salary, 
social allowance, and pensions for public officials 
and 120 per cent rises for military officers.
Yet the decision to intensify the politics of patronage 
by increasing the flow of unproductive payoffs to 
key sectors of society delivers damaging blows 
to the attempts in recent years to scale back the 
role of the state in the economy and boost the 
role of the private sector. Instead of strengthening 
the private sector and weaning citizens off public 
sector employment, the new packages expand 
government spending and widen an already 
large discrepancy between the public and private 
sectors. In addition, they create hostages to fortune 
as they lock in government spending at very high 
levels that depend on the price of oil remaining 
“It is still far from clear…if the instances of regime change will transit 
towards democratization and the consolidation of democratic institutions 
and values.”
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Climate and energy: 
Regulation and 
governance    
Neil Gunningham argues that the central challenge of climate 
change mitigation is energy regulation and governance. 
C limate change is widely recognized as the greatest challenge confronting our generation and as one which, if not 
addressed, may have catastrophic consequences. 
Recent science reveals that the tipping points 
beyond which dangerous climate change becomes 
irreversible are close and that the window for 
effective mitigation is short.
As to how large cuts in carbon emissions might 
be achieved, attention has focused on the role 
of a global climate change agreement. However, 
although some progress was made at the Cancun 
and Durban Climate Change Conferences, 
agreement concerning an emissions trading 
scheme (widely seen as the key mechanism 
through which to drive emissions reductions) still 
seems distant.
But even if such a market mechanism were 
both agreed upon and implemented, it would be 
insufficient to resolve the global climate crisis. 
Carbon pricing does not address the large market 
failures that undermine R&D in climate mitigation, 
such as incompatibility with existing infrastructure 
and weak intellectual property rights protection. 
nor would such a market mechanism sufficiently 
accelerate the development and dissemination of 
low carbon technologies. 
In examining mitigation options “beyond the 
market”, the single most important sector is energy. 
energy production and consumption account for 
over 60 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions, 
and without achieving a drastic transformation 
in the energy sector, a transition to a low carbon 
economy is close to impossible. 
this is every bit as complex a challenge as 
achieving a climate change agreement.  How, for 
example, can resources be pooled to create a 
global technology development fund? How can 
intellectual property constraints on the use of new 
technology be minimized? And how can developing 
countries be integrated effectively into a global 
energy strategy? such questions are about the 
appropriate allocation of scarce resources and 
about co-ordinating collective action. thus they 
are all fundamentally questions of regulation and 
governance concerned with “societal steering”. 
Unfortunately, current regulatory 
frameworks for energy fall far short 
of what is needed to transition 
to a low carbon economy. At 
present, energy sector reform 
is addressed – to the extent 
that it is addressed at all – 
primarily at national level, but 
appropriate strategies differ 
markedly between developed 
and developing countries. 
In the developed world, 
an increasing number of 
countries are beginning to 
explore strategies and tools 
that might be invoked to 
achieve a different energy 
mix. For example, there is 
growing interest in harnessing 
renewable energy, increasing 
energy efficiency, and removing 
fossil fuel subsidies (and dwindling 
commitment to carbon capture and 
storage).
But overall, energy sector reform within 
the nation state is currently modest in the 
extreme. this is perhaps understandable. 
state energy policy must be addressed at a 
time when, in many countries, key state assets 
have been privatized as a result of previous waves 
of market liberalization (and are therefore more 
difficult to influence), while in the developing world 
population growth is increasing pressure on existing 
resources and infrastructure (exacerbating energy 
security concerns). 
However, the situation is gradually changing. When 
governments do act – whether driven by energy 
security considerations, climate change mitigation, 
or some combination of the two – economic 
incentives, regulation, and support for R&D are 
the central tools in the policy arsenal. 
In terms of the first, a few countries and, at regional 
level, the european Union have sought to put a 
price on carbon via either an emissions trading 
scheme or a carbon tax. other economic incentives 
to lower carbon emissions have been introduced, 
but these also suffer from significant limitations, 
not 
least 
imperfect 
information, 
principal-agent 
problems, and behavioural 
failures. 
Accordingly, economic incentives are best seen 
as just one component of a broader mix of energy 
policy initiatives. For example, the International 
energy Agency (2011) argues, with regard to energy 
efficiency, that a number of other policies – primarily 
regulatory – will be necessary in both residential 
appliance electricity use and buildings heating 
use, these being much better able to overcome 
the barriers described above. they include: energy 
performance standards, energy performance 
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labelling, consumer feedback tools, awareness-
raising efforts, and contractual support for the 
construction of low energy buildings. 
In the case of renewable energy, rapid growth 
again depends substantially on 
government policies, 
primarily in the form 
of regulatory 
policies, 
fiscal 
incentives, 
public finance 
mechanisms, and 
climate-led policies. 
Most crucial of all will be the development and 
commercialization of new technologies (particularly 
“break-through technologies”). While some might 
argue that this can be left to the private sector, in 
reality technological innovation is typically a public 
good, with not all of the benefits of new knowledge 
capable of being “captured” by the innovator. 
Accordingly, technological innovation will require 
substantial public expenditure and the development 
of public-private partnerships. 
In the developing world, the challenges are very 
different. the circumstances of Indonesia, the world’s 
second largest thermal coal exporter, illustrate this. 
First, there is a tension between energy security 
(having a reliable and adequate supply of energy at 
reasonable prices) and climate change mitigation. 
With large coal reserves and a growing demand 
for electricity, building more coal fired power 
stations offers a relatively low cost and reliable 
means of increasing electricity production. 
But while this makes sense as a matter of 
political expediency, it runs counter to 
Indonesia’s commitments to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
second, there are perverse 
incentives. Fuel prices are heavily 
subsidized, and removing or even 
reducing these subsidies would 
put the government at serious 
political risk. this makes a 
transition to renewable energy 
extremely difficult.
third, there is the tension 
between climate change 
mitigation, energy policy, and 
economic development. For 
example, Indonesia, along with 
Malaysia, produces about 90 
per cent of the world’s palm 
oil. Widespread deforestation 
is the price for this development, 
but with the Indonesian palm 
oil generating some $14 billion 
per year, further growth of, rather 
than constraints on, deforestation 
is anticipated. Here as elsewhere, 
climate change mitigation continues to 
be trumped by the demands of resource 
exploitation. 
Fourth, no government can deliver on its climate 
and energy promises without harnessing state 
institutions to implement them. But the Indonesian 
bureaucracy lacks capacity, resources, and sufficient 
high quality staff to do so. Key energy policies are not 
well defined, nor is it clear how energy governance 
is handled within the state, with multiple agencies 
having some stake but none the authority or capacity 
to achieve change.
 
of course, much depends upon an individual 
country’s energy profile and capability. By way of 
contrast, south Korea, which imports more than 
90 per cent of its energy, has a strong incentive 
both to increase energy efficiency and identify low 
carbon sources of energy (primarily nuclear power) 
to reduce supply risk and its energy bill. 
But the central challenge of energy governance 
– meeting growing global energy needs while 
transitioning to a low carbon economy – must be 
engaged in globally and regionally, not just at the 
level of the individual nation state. this might include 
a global mechanism to ensure energy supplies in 
crises and emergencies, the development of global 
energy norms, international agreement on intellectual 
property laws that encourage innovation in low 
carbon technologies, co-ordinating and funding 
R&D and mechanisms for technology transfer, and 
support to developing countries.
 
In Asia, regional agreements such as the AseAn 
Petroleum security Agreement, which commits 
signatories to cooperate in times of shortage and 
oversupply, might also be expanded. the trans-
AseAn Gas Pipeline project is already in train 
and will be important in terms of regional energy 
security. An AseAn Power Grid project is also being 
contemplated.
But notwithstanding some modest individual 
achievements, acting collectively on matters of 
collective interest on the scale that will be necessary 
has so far proven an insurmountable challenge. 
states have jealously guarded their autonomy over 
energy issues, especially energy security, with the 
result that global and regional institutions, norms, 
and organizations are weak or absent. 
In the case of the many developing countries that 
lack the economic and the technological capacity 
to bring about an internal energy transition, it is 
only with considerable assistance and support 
that change can be achieved. the degree of 
support currently provided by the World Bank, Asia 
Development Bank, and national aid agencies does 
not remotely approach this level. Whether a sufficient 
proportion of the $100 billion Green Climate Fund, 
the key outcome of Cancun, will be allocated to 
assist the transition to a low carbon economy in 
developing countries remains to be seen.
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RISKY  
 REGULATION
T he idea of regulating by risk – rather than just the regulation of risk – has come to be regarded as a sign of good regulatory 
practice. Risk-based regulation generally provides 
for a more selective monitoring of organizations than 
standardized and all-encompassing programmes 
of inspection and audit for everyone. It is based 
particularly on considerations of organizations 
and their respective track records of regulatory 
compliance, financial soundness, maintenance 
of quality and standards, and the robustness or 
otherwise of internal (risk management) controls.
 Risk-based regulation is an example of the “better regulation” movement across sectors 
and countries in regulatory practice in recent 
years. this is thought best reflected in regulatory 
decision making that is open, transparent, widely 
communicated, and, in the case of risk-based 
regulation, where regulatory attention is focused 
on organizations and practices where risk to 
the taxpayer and the consumer is argued to be 
highest. Cost-benefit analyses and regulatory 
impact assessments are examples of operational 
mechanisms that convey rationality of processes 
and accountability for “better” regulatory activity.
Higher education in england is the latest sector 
to be subject to risk-based regulation. the recent 
White Paper (and upcoming legislation) entitled 
Higher education: students at the heart of the 
system (Department of Business, Innovation and 
skills 2011) proposes that the existing Higher 
“…random inspections may be the price that has to 
be paid for accepting the decreased bureaucratic 
intrusions of risk-based regulation in a way acceptable 
to the public, politicians, and the media…”
Roger King argues that the UK government is introducing risk-based 
regulation to the higher education sector in england in a context where 
its funding policies will significantly increase system and institutional risk.
external quality assurance, not the least important 
that it is conducted in a cyclical and regularly 
scheduled manner to provide protection for all 
students. It is not clear that risk-based regulation 
fits well with these provisions, and the likelihood 
is that it does not.
the introduction of risk-based regulation severely 
jolts QAA’s existing methodology based on 
scheduled, cyclical programmes of review for all 
institutions. the White Paper muses, however, 
that a significant number of institutions might 
be spared such reviews altogether. that is, risk-
based regulation will be more discriminatory to 
the point where only a minority of institutions 
may receive a full review. It will modulate levels 
of institutional audit on the basis of regulatory 
judgements concerning the variable risks posed 
by institutions to the sector and to the consumer 
(and to the regulator). Rather than a consistent 
approach that applies the same levels of scrutiny 
to all providers, risk-based regulation will vary the 
scope and intensity of monitoring against explicit 
calculations of risk.
several criticisms may be levelled at such a 
selective approach to external quality review. First, 
institutions that received good review outcomes 
within the recently completed six-yearly cycle of 
visits conducted by the QAA might easily travel 
in the “wrong direction” (not least as the sector 
becomes more competitive), and weaknesses may 
not be picked up until too late. second, should not 
all students receive the protections and benefits 
of regular external review of the institution at 
which they are studying? Why should some be 
“left uninsured”? Finally, the good practices found 
in high-performing institutions (those which are 
likely to be left out of future reviews or to receive 
more perfunctory monitoring) are much more 
difficult to disseminate throughout the sector as 
a whole; risk-based regulation can undermine 
notions and diffusions of good practice because 
many organizations which display such excellence, 
and which could be important exemplars of 
development for others, may be left out of the 
regulator’s direct oversight.
one approach is for the QAA to adopt random 
inspections, albeit much lighter than full institutional 
reviews, for those deemed to pose least risk to 
the sector. the Hampton Review of 2005, which 
was a major influence on the UK government in its 
education Funding Council for england (HeFCe) 
becomes a risk-based regulator for the system, as 
a “lead” regulator in association with the Quality 
Assurance Agency (QAA), the office For Fair 
Access (oFFA), and the office of the Independent 
Adjudicator (oIA). this is particularly significant 
for external quality assurance and the role and 
perception of the QAA.
Currently QAA, although contracted by HeFCe to 
assure the standards of the programmes it funds, 
operates with high levels of autonomy, signified by 
the strong representation of independent members 
on its Board. It will in future, however, become subject 
to the “direction” of HeFCe as a “lead” regulator. 
HeFCe currently is largely perceived as an agent of 
government rather than as an independent regulator 
or a genuine “intermediary” in the sector.
this change raises at least three political issues. 
First, unless the character and function of 
HeFCe changes, external quality assurance for 
universities and other colleges will be subject more 
formally to governmental intrusion through QAA’s 
“subservience” to HeFCe. second, QAA is a UK-
wide body; however, it will become constrained 
directly by the Funding Council for England. How 
this situation will play out in the wider politics of 
devolution will be interesting in its own right. Finally, 
QAA (and the UK government – as an original 
signatory) has signed up to the predominantly 
european-wide Bologna Agreement on tertiary 
education. this Agreement has a lot to say about 
in HIGHER EDUCATION
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adoption of risk-based regulation more generally, 
was very much in favour of such an approach. 
Universities and colleges, however, dislike such 
visitations, particularly if the notice of the arrival 
of auditors is quite short. It suggests a more 
inspectorial and compliance approach to regulation 
than they feel is appropriate for the autonomies and 
necessary freedoms of, particularly, research-based 
universities. Yet random inspections may be the 
price that has to be paid for accepting the decreased 
bureaucratic intrusions of risk-based regulation in 
a way acceptable to the public, politicians, and the 
media and their notions of accountability.
Although much has been written on the risks of risk-
based regulation for the regulator and the resultant 
organizational strategies for reputational defence 
– Black (2010), and Rothstein and Downer (2008), 
for example – these risks seem magnified when 
governmental policy aims at making a sector even 
riskier than before. Higher education in england is 
just such an example. this shows that it is difficult 
to come to a balanced view about risk-based 
regulation without taking full account of the wider 
context within which it is introduced.
the funding changes being proposed by the 
UK government for higher education in england 
arguably increase the level of risk in the system 
both overall and for many individual institutions. 
the allocations of student places to institutions 
are to be “freed up” by the introduction of a “core 
and margin” model to be administered by HeFCe. 
Around 20,000 students will be stripped from 
core institutional allocations for 2012–13 to form a 
“pool” which will then be bid for by universities and 
colleges with net overall fee levels of £7,500 or less 
on the basis of price (tuition fee levels) and quality. 
Moreover, the core “will reduce every year” with 
“the size of the margin growing steadily in future 
years”, thus almost certainly and progressively 
introducing higher levels of instability, vulnerability, 
and uncertainty for many institutions (Department 
of Business, Innovation and skills 2011: 5).
some institutions are likely to become particularly 
vulnerable to the continual loss of student numbers 
and this may lead to riskier behaviour even by those 
even more competitive globally. A 
perception abroad that a sizeable 
proportion of student places is 
being allocated to institutions 
on the basis of cost and price 
may also damage the english 
brand.
Introducing risk-based regulation to 
higher education follows its introduction 
over the last decade in other sectors in the 
UK, as part of the “Modernizing Government” 
agenda of the new Labour governments. However, 
its rather generalizing spread across government 
does not necessarily make it an appropriate model for 
all sectors in all circumstances. the higher education 
regulators nonetheless will require the capacity 
to learn the lessons from its earlier applications 
elsewhere in government, including those instances 
where risk-based regulation generates high risks for 
the regulators themselves.
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deemed originally as “low risk”. these will need to take 
action to accommodate the lower income that they will 
have as a result of lost student places and the lower 
fees that they will need to charge in order to be eligible 
to recover lost student places. such action could take 
the form of significant cost cutting in budgets for the 
institutional assurance of standards and the provision 
of high quality learning environments.
Revenue seeking in such circumstances may lead 
some institutions to undertake risky entrepreneurial 
behaviour in high fee-earning (unregulated) 
international markets to replace lost domestic 
students. Particularly risky would be an extension of 
franchising and similar vehicles to expand provision 
abroad with untested partners. Failures in such 
activities are particularly prone to media scrutiny 
and scandalizing, and so not only pose greater risks 
to institutions, but also to the regulator (because 
everything that goes wrong can be interpreted 
as a failure of regulation, and if the “lighter touch” 
approach of risk-based regulation has exempted 
the institutions concerned from perceived adequate 
scrutiny, the regulators will be accused of failure 
to protect the public). 
Moreover, the introduction of risk-based regulation 
may significantly and adversely impact on the 
reputation and attraction of english universities as 
a whole, if it is felt abroad that the vast majority of 
english higher education institutions are subject 
only to sparse external quality assurance. Foreign 
senders and funders of international students may 
feel that the quality of at least some provision 
cannot be guaranteed and may consequently look 
elsewhere, despite the obvious encouragement in 
UK government policy for institutions to become 
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T ay-sachs disease (tsD) is a rare metabolic disorder caused by a genetic mutation on chromosome 15 that affects the body’s 
production of the hexosaminidase A enzyme. 
Hex A’s function is to regulate the level of lipids 
or fat in the brain and nervous system. When this 
enzyme is deficient, an excess of fat accumulates, 
leading to visual impairment, profound neurological 
deterioration, and, eventually, death. tay-sachs 
disease includes juvenile and late onset adult 
variations, but the most frequent (albeit still rare) 
form is classic infantile tay-sachs, which is normally 
fatal by age three or four. Commonly associated with 
Jews of eastern european or Ashkenazi descent, 
tsD has also been found to a certain extent among 
some Mediterranean populations, including groups 
of heterogeneous Arab origin, as well as among 
some French-Canadian communities in eastern 
Quebec, the French-Americans of southwestern 
Louisiana, people of Irish/British descent, and, to a 
lesser degree, in the general population. the child 
of two carriers of the genetic mutation that leads to 
tay-sachs has a one in four chance of inheriting the 
mutation and developing the disease. 
since the means to screen for tsD was developed 
in the early 1970s, Jewish communities worldwide 
have willingly participated in reproductive 
counselling and tay-sachs blood screening 
programmes, the latter often carried out among 
school-age children. In fact, even though the 
disease is not exclusive to Ashkenazi Jews, this 
group in particular has most actively availed itself 
of the genetic test for tsD because of its strong 
prevalence among them. their participation in 
screening programmes has had remarkable 
results: the frequency of tsD among American 
and Canadian Jewish communities, for instance, 
has been reduced by more than 90 per cent to 
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Shelley Z Reuter discusses malpractice lawsuits filed on behalf of 
children born with tay-sachs disease, exploring what these cases can 
tell us about how we have come to think about genetic risk. 
“…where genetic risk is concerned even the most informed of 
choices is nonetheless constrained by a set of moral and regulative 
imperatives that responsibilize the individual to exercise their right 
to do the responsible thing.”
individuals or perhaps even all individuals are in turn 
responsibilized to be proactive – encouraged to accept 
responsibility for their own health and optimize their 
lives by making themselves better than they are. 
In a general sense, the concept of responsibilization 
captures practices as mundane as getting regular 
exercise, avoiding junk foods, even taking one’s 
daily multivitamin. In the context of geneticization 
and genetic disease, it usually means seeking out 
genetic testing; the idea is that everyone has a 
responsibility to know themselves genomically and 
prevent irresponsible lives – unoptimized lives – from 
being born. there is a certain sense of obligation 
in this, not just to oneself but also to others. the 
individual’s genes have become something of a 
“public good”, as Callon and Rabeharisoa (2004: 10) 
put it, such that the individual’s existence and even 
her/his “biovalue” (Waldby 2002) are increasingly 
defined – at least in part – by how much of a drain 
on healthcare resources they represent. there is an 
expectation, then, that the individual will do for the 
collective good what ought to be done to prevent an 
unnecessary burdening of the healthcare system. 
Preventing genetic diseases – that is, irresponsible 
lives – follows naturally once the individual has 
become responsibilized to society in this way.
the parents in the lawsuits described above were 
aware of their obligations. Implicit in their arguments 
rates even lower than those found in the general 
population (Kaback et al. 1993; Kaback 2000). 
some cases have still slipped through the net, however, 
and by the end of the 1970s several malpractice suits 
claiming “wrongful life” and/or “wrongful birth” had 
been brought before Us courts by parents of children 
born with tay-sachs disease. Briefly, the defendants 
named in these proceedings – physicians, hospitals, 
and labs – were sued for having neglected to warn 
prospective parents at risk of giving birth to a child with 
tay-sachs and/or for having failed to tell them about 
available genetic tests or prenatal diagnosis. All the 
parents involved argued that, had they known they 
were at risk of giving birth to a child with tsD, they 
would have terminated their pregnancies. 
of course, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims 
are not limited to cases of tay-sachs. A search in 
Westlaw turns up more than 150 lawsuits since 1974 
claiming negligence related to a range of genetic 
or congenital diseases and abnormalities. the 
burgeoning preoccupation with seeking damages 
in such situations has been a significant element of 
the trend in recent decades towards what Canadian 
scholar Abby Lippman (1991: 19) has termed 
geneticization, where most disorders, behaviours, 
and physiological differences between individuals 
are defined at least in part as genetic in origin.
 
In such a context, these wrongful life and birth lawsuits 
have contributed to a complex, contradictory new 
way of thinking about and responding to genetic 
risk. specifically, mitigation of genetic risk, at least 
in the West, has become a widespread cultural 
project. this project is especially resonant for those 
individuals who know or merely suspect they have 
inherited a genetic disorder. As health and disease 
are increasingly understood in genetic terms, these 
Wrongful Life, Tay-Sachs Disease, and the Unfreedom of Choice
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was the notion that their doctors deprived them of 
the opportunity to be responsible when they failed 
to tell them about tsD and available tests. the 
parents saw themselves as deprived of the chance 
not only to optimize their lives through genetic 
testing, but also to prevent any further unoptimized 
or irresponsible life from coming into existence. We 
may question the extent to which these parents 
were really concerned about the collective good 
of society when they elected to bring suit against 
their physicians; nonetheless the parents’ right to 
be responsible had allegedly been violated. their 
claims against their physicians were informed by 
the new normative ethics and politics of genetic 
risk that make our submission to medical authority 
and control a fundamental individual right – a right 
central to our very personhood. 
With the desire to know one’s genetic status and 
the will to be tested on the one hand, and the 
obligation to do so on the other, the line between 
rights and responsibilities has indeed become quite 
precarious. simultaneously, the notion of agency 
or freedom of choice in an age of geneticization 
has become something of an illusion. We need to 
rethink what we mean by “choice”, complicating 
any straightforward ideas about agency or freedom 
at a time when choice is becoming increasingly 
bound up with individual responsibilization. 
What we have at the heart of this public-cum-
individualized politics of genetic risk is a conception of 
agency framed by rationalist interests that govern to 
serve the greater good yet present genetic testing as 
an opportunity for individuals to liberate themselves 
from the shackles of their genetic inheritance. this 
is a liberation ostensibly derived from the choice 
to be screened and the choice to take action on 
learning the results. Yet with these choices comes 
responsibility for their consequences. Making the 
wrong choice – choosing not to be tested – requires 
justification and explanation, because an individual’s 
genetic choices are never relevant to her or him 
alone. the entire family, both existing and potential, 
has something at stake, as does society at large. 
 
In the new dispensation, rational and responsible 
people have themselves genetically tested, while 
irrational and irresponsible people do not. With 
the boundary between coercion and consent so 
thoroughly blurred, it must be recognized that 
where genetic risk is concerned even the most 
informed of choices is nonetheless constrained 
by a set of moral and regulative imperatives that 
responsibilize the individual to exercise their right to 
do the responsible thing. We have the unfreedom 
to choose to be tested, the inalienable right to 
subject ourselves to medical control.
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T hroughout the past decade, national security has come to be understood in terms of “risk”, and the governance 
of  such r i sk  has been p resented 
as a “shared responsibility”. As a result, the 
rhetoric of “public-private partnerships”, “public 
mobilization”, “public awareness”, “corporate 
patriotism”, and “responsible citizenship” has 
become common parlance in the politics of 
protecting the national interest. 
this blurring of the public-private divide has long 
been noted by risk scholars. It is often read as 
yet another instance of neo-liberal governance: 
privatized, individualized, marketized. Yet is that 
really what the emerging practices of civic duty 
signify? or does the language of partnership, 
framed within tropes of fallibility and communality, 
somehow challenge the field of risk studies and the 
neo-liberal orthodoxy that has crystallized? In this 
brief commentary, we use the case of emerging 
national security governance to suggest that risk 
studies must abstain from knee-jerk assumptions 
about the monopoly of neo-liberalism and adopt a 
more empirically sensitive approach to emerging 
risk practices. Moreover, as the practice of 
governing risk eats its way into ever more aspects 
of our social and political world, we need to develop 
theoretical sensitivities capable of understanding 
complexities and variations, rather than simply 
identifying commonalities or reproductions.
Karen Lund Petersen and Vibeke Schou Tjalve examine 
homeland security as a form of public/private risk management which 
escapes the logics of neo-liberal “privatization”.
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“Homeland security starts with hometown 
security…”
nowhere in current Western security governance is 
the language of civic duty and patriotic participation 
as overwhelming as in American counterterrorist 
strategies. Consider for instance the most recent 
metaphor from the Director of the Department for 
Homeland security (DHs): 
“As I said, it [homeland security] requires not just 
a ‘whole of government’, but a ‘whole of nation’ 
approach. In some respects, local law enforcement, 
community groups, citizens, and the private sector 
play as much of a role in homeland security as the 
federal government. that is why I like to say that 
‘homeland security starts with hometown security’” 
(napolitano 2011).
existing scholarship within or at the margins 
of governance studies has gone a long way in 
responding to the kind of “responsibilization” 
which napolitano engages with here, theorizing 
the call for public “preparedness” and “resilience” 
as a technical and de-politicized risk management 
practice. It is not. At face value, the appeal to 
civil society (citizens, nurses, renovation workers, 
banks, transportation systems, insurance 
companies, airports) to share in anticipating 
and shouldering elusive security responsibilities 
may appear as the logical course of action in an 
increasingly uncertain threat environment. Yet to 
“rally the entire society”, as the DHs puts it, is a 
fundamental break with basic principles of the 
modern (liberal) state, in which civic protection 
was always and wholly a state responsibility (DHs 
2002: ii; Petersen 2012). napolitano’s appeal is thus 
part of a larger policy of patriotic mobilization that 
is neither a strategy of mere “technical efficiency” 
nor simply a “privatization of security”. 
Neo-republican security governance?
the politics of shared responsibility cannot be 
unpacked by asking how much responsibility is 
“transferred” from public to private actors, or how 
much authority is retained by government. We 
need to consider seriously the notion of “shared”, 
instead of reducing it to the idea of “transferred”. 
our studies suggest that the rhetoric of public 
mobilization appropriated to support the American 
counterterrorism policy reflects transformations 
of more profound ideological and organizational 
dimensions (Petersen and tjalve forthcoming). Rather 
than disconnecting the public and the private, the 
policies of counterterrorism seek to strengthen the 
moral or ideational links between these two spheres, 
adopting an ideal of communal homogeneity. 
If this strategy of “communality” is not neo-
liberal, then what is it? Clearly, the language of 
“shared responsibility” accentuates an organicist 
and deeply moralist vein in the Western legacy 
of democratic security governance – one which, 
we suggest, is most appropriately termed “neo-
republican”: “republican”, because its primary 
means of public responsibilization draws on the 
language of community, sacrifice, virtue, and civic 
self-regulation; “neo”, because the state-society link 
is a more complex one, and the security policies 
it produces are potentially less democratically 
restrained (Petersen and tjalve forthcoming).
 
the paradox of neo-republican responsibility sharing 
is that the state it reconfigures is both a strengthened 
and weakened one. on the one hand, it installs 
the state as the author of security politics – as a 
supervisor or coach of civic behaviour. on the other 
hand, the state does not want to script the story – it 
does not believe in the possibility of defining what 
needs to be done to reach the so-called political 
goal of eliminating terrorism. Contrary to neo-liberal 
security governance, which rests on the possibility 
of defining the “right” techniques and behaviours (eg 
risk management), the neo-republican language of 
elusiveness, uncertainty, and precaution can make 
no such prescriptions. 
“…the political task of creating a 
resilient society becomes one of 
second order character formation, 
not of direct policy formulations: 
the government is to create the 
kind of society which will define 
and enact resilient behaviour on 
its own accord.”
Karen Lund Petersen is Deputy 
Director of the Centre for 
Advanced security theory (CAst) 
at the University of Copenhagen.
Vibeke Schou Tjalve is a senior 
Researcher at CAst at the 
University of Copenhagen. 
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A recent example of such elusiveness is the 
suspicious Activity Reporting (sAR) initiative 
spurred by the DHs in 2010. the purpose of sAR 
is to facilitate the process of information sharing 
by creating a reporting system for industries and 
the general public to use when they observe 
“suspicious activities” possibly related to terrorism. 
Going through the available material on sAR, the 
absence of explanations of what is meant by 
suspicious activity is striking. the closest one 
gets to an explanation is in a DHs report on the 
protection of privacy, where it is stated that: “All 
sARs are centered on activities, meaning that an 
event or action has occurred that has triggered 
some degree of suspicion” (DHs 2010: 2). A similar 
degree of vagueness characterizes the slogan “If 
you see something, say something”, invented by 
the Metropolitan transportation Authority (MtA). In 
an interview in 2010, the security Director of MtA 
explained the meaning of the term “something”: 
“It is a wide-open thing – don’t be complacent, if 
you see anything that you feel and in your mind 
bothers you”.1 
 
In the name of resilience, citizens are asked to “be 
alert”, “stay awake”, “see something”, and “say 
something”, but the meaning of these terms is left 
to citizens themselves to create. In other words, 
acting “responsibly” is not scripted or defined. As 
such, the political task of creating a resilient society 
becomes one of second order character formation, 
not of direct policy formulations: the government 
is to create the kind of society which will define 
and enact resilient behaviour on its own accord. 
neo-republican security governance thus involves 
the political creation of civic subjectivities able and 
willing to co-create, to define the “something”. 
Beyond the neo-liberal state
In bringing the case of American counterterrorist 
policies to debates on the nature of contemporary 
risk management, we do not dispute the extensive 
political influence of neo-liberal modes of thought 
or the critical value of neo-liberal governmentality 
studies. What we do want to suggest, though, is 
the need for empirical sensitivity: for approaching 
local practices of risk as part of complex historical, 
cultural, and often national governance traditions 
that do not simply fit the bill of “privatization”.
As the case of American counterterrorist policies 
illustrates, neo-liberalism was not the only 
intellectual legacy that modernity brought into 
play in its dealings with uncertainty, insofar as 
rationalist, individualist scientism is not the only 
political philosophy on which the modern state 
was built. neo-republicanism is but one of those 
“other” philosophies relevant to the contemporary 
governance of threats, risk, and security. In our 
opinion, to acknowledge that complexity and the 
rich historical, cultural, and often national patterns 
from which specific practices of risk and security 
management spring is the central theoretical as 
well as empirical challenge that risk scholars of 
the 21st century must face. 
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C orporate financial reporting appears to be a constantly failing endeavour. A seemingly endless stream of revision and reform has 
occupied national and international policy makers 
in the field. For more than 30 years, the common 
aim of regulatory activities has been to increase 
transparency and accountability of companies in 
a capital market setting. 
their success has been put into question by 
published corporate reports which are deemed 
increasingly long, complex, and fragmented. 
According to recent research by Deloitte (2011), 
the average length of the annual report of UK listed 
companies has increased by 123 per cent, from 44 
pages in 1996 to 98 pages in 2011. other studies 
highlight an alarming compartmentalization of the 
corporate reporting system into a set of disconnected 
disclosures (tomorrow’s Company 2011). 
 
new initiatives have been launched in the UK 
and internationally to address these issues. While 
some maintain a traditional focus on the clarity, 
comparability, and understandability of company 
financial statements in the “back end” of the annual 
report (eC 2011), other projects aim for greater 
integration, standardization, and harmonization 
of narrative disclosures in the “front end” (eg eC 
2010; IAsB 2010; BIs 2011; IIRC 2011). they call 
upon companies to demonstrate – more explicitly 
– the links between their financial results, business 
models, long-term objectives, risks, remuneration, 
and a wide range of non-financial factors including 
social and environmental matters. the problem with 
the current and most recent reform programmes is 
that they treat corporate reporting as an outcome by 
focusing almost exclusively on formats and contents. 
Outcome myopia
those involved in corporate reporting may have a 
point when criticizing financial reporting regulators 
for living in “a parallel universe where academia 
and theory take over” (interviewee working in an 
Ftse 100 company). they refer to the development 
of the corporate report into an over-theorized and 
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corporate reporting process of UK listed companies 
suggests that we have reached a point where “no 
one” or at least “very few people” read the full 
version of the annual report (interviewees working 
in Ftse 100 companies). over the past ten years or 
so, the increasing availability of topical information 
about the company through other channels has 
changed the ways in which the annual report 
is used. technical developments have made it 
possible to communicate topical information 
about the company’s strategy, governance, and 
performance through websites, webcasts, or 
interactive applications. the practice of releasing 
preliminary results contributes to an additional 
decrease of the incremental decision value of the 
information provided in some companies’ final 
annual reports.
Professional investors are often quoted as saying 
that they prefer personal communication with the 
company. According to their own accounts, fund 
managers use the annual report selectively, at most, 
to check the consistency of the financial information 
on which their investment models are based. In that 
sense, the annual report may be understood as a 
“hygiene factor” that needs to be clear, consistent, 
and easy to understand, but that contributes little 
to managing the expectations of investors. the only 
exception seems to be published information on 
remuneration. the Directors’ Remuneration Report 
is often the only element that constitutes “news” 
by the time the annual report is released. 
the fragmented and overall limited use of the 
annual report by external parties raises fundamental 
questions about the emphasis on “the user” in 
corporate reporting regulation. evidence is emerging 
that new policies should be defined alongside 
the ways in which annual reporting information 
over-politicized object of regulatory intervention, 
while the more mundane processes of corporate 
reporting remain unobserved. the risk of ongoing 
reform is to trigger fatigue rather than progress 
by creating a complex system of ever expanding 
and overlapping requirements that are detached 
from the challenges of communicating a coherent 
“equity story” in practice. First, policy makers 
commonly speak of “the user” of published reports, 
but rarely consider how the annual report is actually 
used. second, the entity concept of financial 
reporting suggests a unity of “the preparer” that 
is not necessarily reflected in the act of preparing 
the annual report. In other words, what remains 
overlooked in proposals for financial reporting 
reform are the people, processes, and institutions 
which constitute corporate reporting in action.
Who are “the users”? 
Policy debates tend to portray the annual report as a 
key instrument of corporate governance. spectacular 
corporate failures are often blamed on weaknesses 
in the corporate reporting system, as in the cases of 
enron, Worldcom, or Parmalat in the early 2000s. 
the global financial crisis of 2008 rang new alarm 
bells about difficulties to discern the message 
about the long-term financial health of companies 
from published financial and other statements. 
Further enhancements to corporate reporting are 
demanded in order to help investors (shareholders 
being the primary users of published financial reports 
according to company law) and other report users in 
the future to make better informed decisions about 
their relationship with the company and to prevent 
similar crises of governance from recurring. However, 
there appears to be a great disparity between the 
reporting ideal in policy making and the practical use 
of corporate reports once they have been published. 
Anecdotal evidence from those involved in the 
“…what remains overlooked in proposals for financial reporting 
reform are the people, processes, and institutions which constitute 
corporate reporting in action.”
Yasmine Chahed discusses why regulators should pay greater 
attention to the corporate reporting process when looking for 
solutions for symptoms of reporting “failure”. 
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is implicated in the activities and decisions of 
preparer organizations themselves. While external 
communication increasingly takes place through 
other channels, the components of the annual 
report continue to provide important points of 
condensation around which internal perceptions 
of the organization and its performance materialize.
Who are “the preparers”?
Regulatory reform in corporate reporting also 
often seems to fail because the internal process 
and control challenges of preparing corporate 
reports in practice are not reflected in programmes 
for change.1  Put simply, the corporate reporting 
process is not as clear-cut as the fundamental 
entity concept of corporate financial reporting 
suggests. In spite of the legal assumption that 
the formal responsibility for the preparation of the 
annual report rests with the board of directors and 
its committees, the production of the document 
that is eventually released to the public involves 
a range of organizational functions and extra-
organizational knowledge. the dispersion of the 
reporting process within and across the boundaries 
of the reporting entity makes it more difficult to use 
the annual report as a means of telling a coherent 
“financial story” about the organization and to 
give management the opportunity to tell it in their 
own words.
A few years into the 21st century, it may still have 
been accurate to assume that the finance function 
in most large corporations owned and controlled 
the production of the annual report in its entirety. 
today, the responsibility for formally overseeing and 
coordinating the reporting process rests in many 
cases with the company secretary. the secretary 
holds a senior administrative function and acts 
as the advisor to the board and the chairman on 
compliance and corporate governance related 
matters. As part of their work, the secretarial 
team often draft all or parts of the governance 
sections in published reports, which are formally 
signed off by the respective board committees. 
the narrative sections on strategy and business 
models tend to be drafted by investor relations 
or corporate communications departments. 
this often leaves finance teams with the task of 
preparing the financial statements and supplying 
any financial numbers that are presented in 
other parts of the report. At the same time, the 
market for external corporate reporting advisors is 
growing. traditionally, the involvement of corporate 
communications agencies and public relations 
experts in the reporting process centred on the 
visual and textual design and the coordination 
of the printing stage. their services have shifted 
towards helping companies develop coherent 
reporting strategies, the supply of benchmarking 
data on reporting “best practice”, and the drafting 
of skeleton reports. A wide range of expert advisors 
also provide specialized inputs into the content of 
reports on pensions or remuneration. During the 
finishing stage, legal experts may be called in to 
perform compliance checks. 
Addressing the challenges
Breaking the cycle of financial reporting “failure” 
and reform will require much greater attention to 
the challenges of corporate reporting in action. 
Current ambitions to promote the quality and 
integration of information in corporate reports 
are met by an increasing fragmentation of the 
processes of preparing and using the published 
reports and accounts in their present form. to 
prevent corporate reporting from dissolving into 
the space of box-ticking and compliance, policy 
makers need to rethink conventional categories. 
An outcome centred view on “the corporate report” 
as a means of connecting “the reporting entity” 
with its wider environment fails to acknowledge 
the complexity of the social processes by which 
it facilitates communication and action within and 
beyond organizational boundaries. In particular, a 
company level view of “the preparer” risks masking 
the multitude of functions and areas of expertise 
that need to be managed internally in order to 
ensure compliance and integrity of information. 
Research on corporate reporting as a social 
practice can help demonstrate how such reports in 
the 21st century are implicated in diverse economic 
as well as social and political relationships. 
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1 the agenda of corporate reporting reform is 
typically driven by a broad stakeholder community, 
including preparers and investors as well as political 
parties, trade unions, nGos, academia, professional 
membership bodies, and professional service firms. 
H ow practicable would be a reform of financial innovation that could lead to the development of a genuine culture 
of responsibility? Debates on responsible and 
irresponsible innovation in finance are attracting ever 
more attention. this is partly a result of the global 
financial crisis of the late 2000s. the need for change 
is widely acknowledged in policy circles as well as by 
some members of the financial services community. 
But regulatory oversight often fails to cope with 
the sophistication of practice, and measures of 
accountability rarely count on banking culture as 
a natural ally. Investment banks, however, possess 
organizational features which, once conveniently 
retooled, can make substantial contributions to the 
development of responsible innovation in finance. 
An interdisciplinary working group sponsored 
by the observatory for Responsible Innovation, 
an independent think tank established at Mines 
Paristech, has been looking in that direction. Its 
focus has been on new Product Committees (see 
Armstrong et al. 2012).
In the financial services industry, the notion of new 
Product Committee or new Product Approval refers 
to the organizational structures and group meetings 
inside an investment bank in which the development 
and launch of a new product or service are discussed. 
Within these spaces, risks and opportunities are 
assessed, decisions are validated, and tasks and 
responsibilities are attributed. Product approval 
processes have been in operation for quite a long 
time, for instance in the form of project development 
groups. But the institutionalization of new Product 
Committees as such is a quite recent phenomenon. 
traces of their emergence can be found in the 
framework of the Basel II Accords. Regulators have 
since been introducing the idea of a mandatory 
approval for new products. the form this may take 
inside each investment bank is still dependent on 
organizational idiosyncrasies.
In short, new Product Committees are meant to be 
spaces in which responsibility for the consequences 
of innovation – including the negative ones – is (or 
can be) collectively taken. But is that really the case? 
It is up to bankers and regulators to look into this 
as a serious potential. 
Where are we today? new Product Committees in 
the financial services industry are generally open 
to a multiplicity of concerned parties, but limited to 
the internal perimeter of the credit institution or the 
investment firm. Participants are members of the 
teams in charge of financial engineering and trading, 
risk analysis, legal compliance, accounting, and 
clearing and settlement. there is no widespread 
practice of extending the perimeter of new Product 
Committees and inviting participants from outside 
the firm. there are no industry-wide guidelines for 
the governance of new Product Committees, which 
is defined internally. Worries and concerns can 
generally be expressed by relevant departments 
within these spaces, yet sometimes a marked sense 
of hierarchy, an over-emphasis on competition, or 
a harsh climate of professional progress may lead 
to situations in which some actors refrain from 
expressing concerns or are simply not heard. In 
principle, new Product Committees can also assess 
the evolution and effects of a service or product 
which has already been released into the market. the 
innovation is thus open to a cyclical revision process 
or to preventive steps that can be implemented 
before the innovation is too widely disseminated, 
and hence difficult to restrain. Moreover, new 
Product Committees are instruments for tracing 
decisions and responsibilities. Decision making 
results in the production of signed documents 
which thereby certify that signatory parties are 
accountable. But new Product Committees are 
sometimes also seen as an administrative burden, 
impairing the unleashing of financial imagination 
(traders and financial engineers generally hold this 
view), and the organizational measures are not 
always popular among bank employees. the fact 
that new Product Committees somehow produce 
legitimacy and allow new products to join the chain 
of existing products may not be sufficient to make 
Responsibility in  
financial innovation 
RetooLInG neW PRoDUCt 
CoMMIttees
“…as part of the organizational culture of the investment bank, New 
Product Committees strengthen the penetration of responsibility into 
professional habits, and they could strengthen it further through their 
role in career development.”
Fabian Muniesa considers the potential 
contributions of New Product Committees to the 
development of responsible innovation in finance.
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these committees attractive. Compliance officers 
and other actors in charge of regulatory verification 
inside the financial firm play an important role in new 
Product Committees. Yet they are often caught 
between contradictory commitments: towards the 
firm on the one hand, towards the regulator on the 
other hand.
What can be done? As pointed out by Armstrong et 
al. (2012), once conveniently retooled, new Product 
Committees can be made appropriate hubs for the 
development of responsible innovation in finance. 
Firstly, the new Product Committee is a place in which 
the function of the product can be discussed and 
made explicit – an environment in which the purpose 
of the financial innovation could be publicly articulated 
and justified. secondly, the role of the compliance 
officer could be strengthened and improved. It need 
not remain limited to warranting regulatory verification 
(ie restrained to a “box-ticking” view), but could 
instead be more oriented towards raising questions 
and moral issues. this would help transform the 
new Product Committee into a robust relay towards 
regulators. thirdly, as part of the organizational culture 
of the investment bank, new Product Committees 
strengthen the penetration of responsibility into 
professional habits, and they could strengthen it 
further through their role in career development. 
For example, valid experience within new Product 
Committees could be considered as a requisite 
for accessing high responsibility positions in the 
organization. Fourthly, the new Product Committee 
is the space in which the limitations of modelling 
and forecasting can be acknowledged. this makes 
possible their compensation by discussions about 
qualitative considerations and through a commitment 
to revising and reassessing the innovation and its 
behaviour once it has been introduced into the market. 
Fifthly, membership to new Product Committees is 
already a form of personal accountability. this can 
be improved through a long-term commitment of 
participants (taking into account staff turnover), which 
would involve the recalibration of their economic 
incentives in light of their ability to commit to the 
long-run assessment of the innovation. sixthly, the 
new Product Committee can be the place where 
issues of calibration and dissemination of innovation 
are systematically raised. this clinical perspective 
can be connected to an industry-wide initiative for 
setting indicative precautionary thresholds for the 
size and scope of an innovation, preventing full 
mass marketing before a testing period. Finally, new 
Product Committees allow for an informal deliberative 
process in which the voicing of concerns could be 
improved by procedures and codes of conduct that 
ensure that each participant has an equal say and 
this can include inviting external observers.
the conclusions of the observatory for Responsible 
Innovation are quite promising: both regulatory 
measures and industry initiatives could find in 
new Product Committees a space conducive 
to the advancement of responsible innovation 
in finance. In his remarks at the Conference on 
Debating Responsible Innovation in Finance, held 
on 30 november  2011 at Mines Paristech, CARR 
Director Michael Power observed the extent to 
which the organization of innovation in the financial 
services industry lacks proper understanding of 
how laboratories work in other areas (such as 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, biomedicine, 
telecommunications, and energy). new Product 
Committees can be effectively retooled to enhance 
that understanding.
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A utomated financial markets dominate today’s financial activity. Most of the trading done on a daily basis is generated through 
automatic algorithms and much of the orders in 
exchanges are matched by automatic computer 
programs. Automated trading is commonly regarded 
as a straightforward outcome of technological 
advancement. the usual argument is that information 
and communication technology became affordable 
and available and thus made trading in financial 
markets cheaper, quicker, and easier to trace and 
audit. this argument, however, is partial. It does not 
account for how automated markets came about, 
what actors took part in shaping them, and, crucially, 
how these historical processes affect today’s financial 
markets and the potential risks they impose. 
In a recent report for the UK treasury and the 
Department of Business, Innovation and skills, we 
examined the history of automated markets. We 
found that in the Us and the UK, regulators and 
economists played important roles in shaping these 
markets and that this history introduced certain risks 
to the structure of financial markets. We found that 
regulators and economists, each motivated by a 
different worldview, advocated and actively took part 
in the design of a market without human intermediaries 
and that this quest contributed to the creation of 
today’s financial markets and their unique set of risks.
 
In the Us, regulatory attempts to improve the market 
by targeting intermediaries (such as market makers 
or specialists) go back to the 1960s. At the time, 
the securities and exchange Commission (seC) 
became dissatisfied with the wide spreads quoted 
by dealers in the over-the-counter market and 
concluded that a market based on a loose network 
of dealers connected by telephones and restrained 
by self-regulation was too difficult to supervise. the 
seC favoured replacing the dealers with information 
technology, requiring electronic quote dissemination 
at the new market, the nAsDAQ, in 1971.
In the same year, the economist Fischer Black argued 
for replacing financial intermediaries (in this case, 
the specialists at the new York stock exchange) 
with a central computer. Unlike the seC, which saw 
human intermediaries as a problem for regulation, 
Black believed that markets were fundamentally 
large price-discovery systems and as such could 
be reduced to electronic networks of participants 
linked by cables, leading to a “thinking whole”. In 1972, 
following public hearings in the Us Congress where 
Black and other economists gave testimonies, the 
seC published a statement in support of automatic 
markets and appointed an advisory committee to 
develop a detailed policy proposal; the committee 
included several of the notable supporters of electronic 
trading. the general motivation for the seC’s initiative 
was the concentration of power that human market 
intermediaries accumulated and the biases that this 
structural characteristic introduced. the suggested 
solution to this problem was a central market (known 
as the national Market system) where, it was hoped, 
the sheer number and diversity of intermediaries would 
prevent any of them from becoming too powerful.
As the committee operated, the influence of economics 
in the seC grew. In 1975, the seC established the 
office of economic Analysis within the organization 
and, a year later, the national Market Advisory Board 
(nMAB), another committee that was responsible for 
assessing the changes necessary as a result of the 
amendments. Following the recommendations from 
these bodies, a set of regulatory steps was put in place 
that tied together the various American exchanges in 
a system of communications. 
In the following ten years, more regulations were 
implemented, increasing the informational connectivity 
among markets. Human intermediaries, however, 
were not removed from the market, but were 
“surrounded” by an ever deeper and more complex 
set of technological devices. A chain of scandals 
beginning in the late 1980s gradually eroded the trust 
in market intermediaries. In the wake of the october 
1987 market crash, market makers at the nAsDAQ 
were accused of opportunistic behaviour because 
they did not fulfil their obligations. In 1994, it was 
found again that nAsDAQ market makers colluded 
to set stock prices. In August 2003, Richard Grasso, 
the powerful Ceo of the new York stock exchange 
(nYse), who was a staunch supporter of human 
market intermediaries, was embroiled in a scandal 
and had to resign. In october of that year, five of the 
nYse’s leading specialists’ firms were found to have 
abused their positions and fined.  
Following these scandals, the seC implemented 
its most ambitious move towards an automation of 
markets. new rules connected all exchanges to a fast 
network of communications and market orders, leaving 
human intermediaries a reaction time of one second. 
As a direct result, activity in Us financial exchanges 
was transferred mostly to automatic execution. the 
connectivity among exchanges meant that orders that 
were not executed quickly were routed automatically 
to another exchange and a race for speed began. the 
automation of execution also affected the generation 
of orders. Using the fast connectivity, investors split 
their orders into increasingly smaller parts, which 
were sent anonymously to different exchanges, thus 
hiding the overall size of the trade and avoiding having 
an impact on market prices. By 2008, most human 
intermediaries had disappeared from Us exchanges 
and financial markets were dominated by automation.
A similar picture emerges from the historical 
developments in the UK. the London stock 
exchange (Lse), which had employed a system 
of human intermediaries and dominated financial 
trading until the 1970s, saw a challenge in 1973, when 
merchant banks were successful in abolishing the 
fixed commissions the exchange charged, an act that 
led to the development of an independent electronic 
trading platform. In 1986, in what is often referred to 
as Big Bang, the UK financial system witnessed the 
introduction of an electronic dealing system, seAQ, 
which emulated the operation of the trading floor 
through a network of screens and phones. 
In the UK, we also see that the regulatory environment 
began to incorporate economic theory. From the late 
1980s onwards, the office of Fair trading (oFt) and 
other government bodies increasingly sought advice 
from economists. Researchers from City University 
and the Financial Markets Group of the London school 
of economics were particularly active in conducting 
studies of the stock market which reverberated with 
the views of the oFt. to a considerable extent, market 
regulation policies forged ahead and after 1990 were 
informed by the economic theory that necessitated 
transparency for maintaining fairness and efficiency 
in the market. 
these ideas and the regulatory motivation preceded 
the introduction of tradepoint in the mid 1990s. 
tradepoint was the first complete automatic 
alternative to the Lse, as it automated the process 
of collecting and matching orders from investors 
and offered anonymous direct market access. From 
the economists’ perspective, tradepoint provided 
an intermediary-free mechanism of exchange for 
institutions because it allowed direct access to 
the exchange’s matching procedure instead of 
intermediation over the phone. the British regulators 
THE ROOTS OF RISKS IN AUTOMATED 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
“The specific form taken by market automation has undermined the 
social mechanisms of norm enforcement traditionally deployed by 
human intermediaries.”
Daniel Beunza, Donald MacKenzie, Yuval Millo, and Juan Pablo 
Pardo-Guerra analyse the history of automated financial markets, trace 
the impact of economists and regulators on the shaping of these markets, 
and discuss some of the risks that may emerge as a result. 
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also saw tradepoint as a positive development and 
encouraged its developers to register the system as an 
exchange. As in the Us case, the developments in the 
UK market, leading to the introduction of tradepoint, 
triggered increased competition, reduced spreads in 
the most active shares, and, consequently, lowered 
the intermediaries’ returns per trade. these factors 
paved the way to financial markets where human 
intermediaries were marginalized and automation 
became dominant. 
What are the implications of these historical events 
for the behaviour of automated markets? In particular, 
what potential risks were created along with the 
evolvement of automated trading systems? From our 
analysis, we identify three types of risks.
First, the risk of a weak norms market. the specific 
form taken by market automation has undermined the 
social mechanisms of norm enforcement traditionally 
deployed by human intermediaries. In many markets, 
such as the nYse, for example, human intermediaries 
lost much of their clout because they were no longer 
the exclusive source of order for other traders. 
Furthermore, connectivity and the rise of anonymous 
orders diminished the ability of exchanges to impose 
desired behaviours through their procedures. the 
growing technological component of markets also 
increased the distance between the innovators 
and the users of the systems. Whilst in the past 
the designers of trading rules came from among 
traders themselves, in automated markets innovation 
was spearheaded by engineers and computer 
communication experts. the latter were less familiar 
with the informal norms and codes of behaviour that 
affected trading practices and, consequently, did not 
embed these into the automated trading systems they 
developed. Hence markets typified by weak norms 
may include adequate rules, but lack effective social 
and technological infrastructure through which such 
rules may be implemented and employed. 
second, the risk of toxic transparency. this risk can 
be understood on the basis of steve Wunch’s insight 
that pursuing transparency through a system where 
trading orders are openly visible to all other market 
participants and where orders can be immediately 
acted upon by others may have the perverse effect 
of deterring investors from participating in the 
market and thus lowering liquidity in the markets. 
An indication of the significance of this risk comes 
from the recent proliferation of dark pools – non-
exchange trading venues where relative anonymity 
is maintained. While offering a solution to the traders, 
dark pools also increase the fragmentation of orders 
and further exacerbate the negative impact of toxic 
transparency on liquidity.
third, the risk of fragmented innovation. Automation 
of financial markets motivated innovators to focus 
primarily on improving speeds. this focus, in turn, 
increased secrecy in the field and has narrowed the 
scope that any single actor may have. As a result, 
market participants make decisions about the design 
and development of systems as well as operational 
day-to-day activities while being, in effect, ignorant 
of their potential systemic implications. 
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CARR Discussion Groups
CARR’s three discussion groups on Financial Advice, Risk Indicators, and Failure-Resilience have 
continued. they have provided a useful forum for discussing the risk culture project (see editorial 
above) and other initiatives.
CARR News
Mike Power has joined the Advisory Panel of the 
office of the Rail Regulator and has become a member 
of the Advisory Board for the Public Private Relations 
Platform at Copenhagen Business school. In March, 
Mike presented a paper on “Accounting for the impact 
of research” at the Birkbeck and Institute for Voluntary 
Action Research seminar.
Bridget Hutter chaired the British Library and 
strategic society Centre joint debate “From the other 
side: social scientists inside government” (november) 
and presented the paper “Governing food risks: the 
role of the state and non-state influences” at the 
Forschungswerkstatt of the Freie Universität Berlin 
(December). In March, Bridget chaired “Myths and 
realities 13 security and surveillance: has it gone too 
far?”, a public lecture organized and supported by the 
Academy of social sciences and the British Library, 
and spoke on “Managing food safety and hygiene” in 
a Food standards Agency seminar.
In november, Peter Miller presented the paper 
“Democratising failure: the making of a calculative 
infrastructure for forgiving and forecasting failure” at 
the Workshop on strategy, organization and society 
at Copenhagen Business school. In the same month, 
Peter, together with Irvine Lapsley (University of 
edinburgh), organized the workshop Accountants in 
the Risk society – sponsored by the Institute of Public 
sector Accounting Research – at the University of 
edinburgh Business school. the keynote speakers 
were Barbara Czarniawska (Gothenburg 
University) and Mike Power, who presented a paper 
on “Fraud risk: an archaeological analysis”. 
Christopher Sampson, a CARR PhD student 
in Lse’s Government Department, conducted 
research at Peking University for his dissertation on 
“Industrial reform and the dynamics of government-
enterprise relations in China’s water and electricity 
supply”. During his research trip, he attended the 
6th China International Water Business summit and 
participated in a discussion panel on China’s energy 
legislation at an energy Review Academic salon. 
Christopher also took part in a number of Beijing 
energy & environment Roundtables, conducted 
pilot interviews with senior representatives of water 
supply firms, and evaluated Chinese industry and 
media reports on the water and power sectors. A 
visiting scholar to the PKU school of Government 
and the Leo Ko-Guan Institute of Business and 
Government between september and December 
2011, Christopher was supported by CARR and the 
Lse PhD Mobility Bursary Fund. He is scheduled 
to return to Beijing for further research in mid 2012. 
Publication
The Managerialization of Security  
Mike Power in Securitization, Accountability and Risk Management: Transforming the Public Security 
Domain by Karin svedberg Helgesson and Ulrika Mörth (eds), Routledge 2012.
CARR Seminars 
2011/12
6 December 2011
Dr Javier Lezaun
oxford University
The Transitional Objects of the Law
31 January 2012
Dr David Demortain
IFRIs, Paris-est University
Ideals of Governability in Risk Regulation. 
Or Where Do Risk-Based Decision-Making 
Frameworks Come From?
6 March 2012
Professor Preben Lindøe
stavanger University
Robust Regulation in the Offshore 
Petroleum Industry – An Assessment of 
Different Approaches
CARRPeoPLe
Risk&Regulation, summer 2012  23 
CARR Directorate
Professor Michael Power
Director, CARR; Professor of Accounting, 
Accounting Department
Role of internal and external auditing; Risk 
reporting and communication; Financial 
accounting and auditing regulation.
Dr Martin Lodge
Deputy Director, CARR; Reader in Political Science 
and Public Policy, Government Department
Comparative regulation and public 
administration; Government and politics of the 
EU and of Germany; Railway regulation in Britain 
and Germany; Regulatory reform in Jamaica.
CARR Research staff
Dr Julien Etienne
British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow
Regulatory compliance, administrative errors, 
and major accident hazard regulation.
CARR senior  
Research Associates
Professor Bridget Hutter
Professor of Risk Regulation,  
Sociology Department
Sociology of regulation and risk management; 
Regulation of economic life; Corporate responses 
to state and non-state forms of regulation
Professor Peter Miller
Professor of Management Accounting, 
Accounting Department
Accounting and advanced manufacturing 
systems; Investment appraisal and capital 
budgeting; Accounting and the public sector; 
Social and institutional aspects of accounting.
CARR Research Associates
Professor Michael Barzelay - Professor of 
Public Management, LSE
Dr Matthias Benzer  - Lecturer in Sociology, 
Department of Sociological Studies, University 
of Sheffield
Dr Daniel Beunza - Lecturer in Management, 
Management Department, LSE
Professor Gwyn Bevan - Professor of 
Management Science, LSE
Professor Julia Black - Professor of Law, LSE
Dr Adam Burgess - Senior Lecturer in 
Sociology, School of Social Policy, Sociology 
and Social Research, University of Kent
Dr Yasmine Chahed - Lecturer in Accounting, 
Accounting Department, LSE
Professor Damian Chalmers - Professor of 
European Union Law, LSE
Dr David Demortain - Research Fellow, IFRIS, 
University of Paris-Est. 
Dr Anneliese Dodds - Lecturer in Public 
Policy, Sociology and Public Policy Group, 
Aston University
Dr John Downer -Zukerman Fellow, Center 
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Stanford University
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History Unit, LSE
Professor Michael Huber - Professor for 
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and Economic Governance, University of 
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Dr Andrea Mennicken - Lecturer in 
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Accounting Department, LSE
Professor Edward C Page - Sidney and 
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